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Abstract 
Starting from two passages of the autobiography of Lipman, which represent the description of 
a sort of ‘primary scene’ of P4C, the presented paper shows how the Deweyan notion of 
qualitative thought is pivotal for the entire Lipmanian undertaking. Dewey’s distinction 
between ‘situation’ and ‘object’ in thinking is read into the Lipman differentiation of schemata 
and concepts and used to analyze the reasons for which narrative comes to play a crucial role in 
the project of education for thinking. The mobilization of narrative entails a movement of 
turning the history of philosophy inside out, which may be considered the major achievement 
(both educationally and philosophically) of Lipman. This movement is opposite to that of mere 
historicization and can also be construed in terms of ‘dramatization,’ culminating in the Bildung. 
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Las novelas de Lipman o llevar a la filosofía completamente hacia afuera 
 
Resumen: 
A partir de dos pasajes de la autobiografía de Lipman, en los cuales se representa la descripción 
de una especie de “escena primaria” de P4C, este artículo se propone mostrar cómo la noción de 
pensamiento cualitativo de Dewey es fundamental en toda la obra lipmaniana. La distinción de 
Dewey entre “situación” y “objeto” en el pensamiento es leída en el interior de la diferenciación 
que Lipman hace de esquema y concepto para analizar las razones por las cuales la narrativa 
juega un papel crucial en el proyecto de educación para el pensamiento. La movilización de la 
narrativa implica un movimiento de llevar la historia de la filosofía hacia afuera, el cual puede 
ser considerado el mayor logro (educativo y filosófico) de Lipman. Este movimiento es opuesto 
a la mera historización y puede también ser construido en términos de “dramatización”, 
culminando en la Buildung. 
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As novelas de Lipman ou virar a filosofia de cabeça para baixo 
 
Resumo: 
A partir dos trechos da autobiografia de Lipman, nos quais se representa a descrição de uma 
espécie de “cena primária” de P4C, o presente artigo se propõe mostrar como a noção de 
pensamento qualitativa de Dewey é fundamental em toda a obra lipmaniana. A distinção de 
Dewey entre “situação” e “objeto” no pensamento é lida no interior da diferenciação que 
Lipman faz entre esquema e conceito para analisar as razões pelas quais a narrativa tem um 
papel crucial no projeto de educação para o pensamento. A mobilização da narrativa implica 
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um movimento de virar a história da filosofia de cabeça para baixo, o que pode ser considerado 
o maior êxito (educativo e filosófico) de Lipman. Esse movimento é oposto à mera historicização 
e pode também ser construído em termos de “dramatização”, culminando na Bildung.  
 
Palavras-chave: Matthew Lipman, Bildung, Narrativa, Novela Filosófica. 
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LIPMAN’S NOVELS OR TURNING PHILOSOPHY INSIDE-OUT  
 
 
The	  ‘Primary	  Scene’	  of	  P4C	  
In Lipman’s autobiography the account of how the project of writing a 
philosophical novel emerged is immediately preceded by the memory of a children’s art 
exhibition. The relevant passages are worth mentioning at length: 
The painting showed me a depth that I hadn’t thought children were 
capable of, and I had little difficulty understanding their creative 
processes as a form of thinking. I began to wonder, if children could 
contrive such powerful works in this medium, what were they capable 
of in other media?...Could there not be certain topics on which children’s 
thinking approached or perhaps even exceeded the thinking of adults? 
Could there not be in children what Dewey called ‘qualitative thought’ – 
though in sounds and in colors, for example, and not just in words, 
concepts or logical relationships?...The children’s art exhibition at 
Summerhill touched off in me a lively scepticism about the reduction of 
all thinking about thinking to linguistic discourse...And it added to the 
respect that was growing in me for the curious power of thought of 
children...1 
	  
Such an account is explicitly related by Lipman himself to another memory, more 
closely connected with his personal family life: 
My own son, Will, managed to underscore this point [i.e. the curious 
power of thought of children SO] one day as he stepped out of the bath 
around age two. As I handed Will his pajamas, he noticed that they were 
inside-out and immediately exclaimed, "Oh, japamas!"...On one occasion 
we were discussing [with Rudolph Arnheim] the symmetries that 
sometimes emerged between thought and behaviour...and this is when I 
shared the story of Will inverting the word ‘pajamas’ to ‘japamas’ to 
parallel the visual display of inside-out pajamas that he saw before him.2 
	  
The latter episode works strikingly as a springboard to a definition of the entire 
project of Philosophy for Children (P4C): 
Twenty years later, when a champion of Philosophy for Children, 
Professor Alex Andonov of the University of Sofia in Bulgaria, was 
asked how he would characterize this new version of philosophy, he 
replied, "Why, it’s inside-out philosophy!" What a wonderful insight on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matthew Lipman, A Life Teaching Thinking (Montclair, NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for 
Children, 2008), 105-6. 
2 Ibid, 106. 
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Andonov’s part of the relationship between philosophy for children and 
traditional philosophy!3 
	  
Without indulging in a more in-depth and thorough analysis of these passages it 
is possible to state that they have to do with a sort of ‘primary scene’ (the expression 
being here destitute of any pulsional overtones). Investigating into this, in its layers and 
thematic nodes, provides a major access to the origin, meaning and import of Lipman’s 
view about philosophical novels. Within the framework of this present paper it will be 
impossible to disentangle the many and multifarious theoretical threads interwoven in 
the quoted passages—for example, how is the idea of P4C connected to a re-discovery 
and a re-valorisation of the thoughtful dimension of perception, as Rudolph Arnheim, 
mentioned by Lipman, taught us to detect? How are the pre-/non-linguistic dimensions 
of thinking linked with the linguistic ones and how does the very recognition of this 
link operate at the level of the creation of the P4C curriculum as well as at the level of its 
implementation? Or to put it differently and provocatively: may not the very idea of a 
community of gestures4 be ‘just’ the unfolding of an arché, a ‘regulative’ principle, 
already incubated in the ‘primary scene’ which gave rise to Lipman’s innovative 
educational proposal? 
The focus here will be, rather, on how (and in what sense) the ‘invention’ of the 
philosophical novel represents a movement of turning (the history of) philosophy 
inside-out, and on how such a movement, insofar as it is a ‘storifying’ of philosophy as 
distinct from, if not opposed to, its ‘historicization’,5 is intrinsically intertwined with the 
involvement of children with their own way of thinking in the philosophical dialogue.6 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. 
4 See, David Kennedy, “The Five Communities,” Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, vol. 16, no. 
4 (1997): 66-86. 
5 See, Sergio Givone, Il Bibliotecario di Leibniz: Filosofia e Romanzo (Torino: Einaudi, 2005). 
6 Matthew Lipman, “Philosophical Discussion Plans and Exercises,” Analytic Teaching, vol. 16, no. 2 (1995-
1996): 64. 
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Situating	  Philosophy	  or	  What	  We	  Cannot	  Speak	  About	  We	  Must	  Narrate	  
What is the ‘inside’ of philosophy which a philosophy for children allows one to 
“put on the outside” while putting “the outside on the inside”?7 And why can only 
philosophy for children do that? And why exactly through the narrative medium? 
 We can move from the Deweyan notion of ‘qualitative thought’ mentioned by 
Lipman at the very outset of what I have called the primary scene of P4C. The emphasis 
on qualitative thought in Dewey is not first and foremost, despite Lipman’s remarks, a 
matter of how thought is expressed (whether in sounds and in colors instead of 
concepts and logical relationships) but it entails a re-consideration of the entire process 
of thinking and of its ‘products.’ 
If it is undeniable that “[t]he world in which we immediately live, that in which 
we strive, succeed, and are defeated is preeminently a qualitative world”,8 
then―Dewey highlights―“the immediate existence of quality, and of dominant and 
pervasive quality, is the background, the point of departure, and the regulative 
principle of all thinking.”9 The question is not, therefore, to oppose qualitative to logical 
thinking―as if the quality concerned only feeling or intuition as non-thinking 
‘faculties’―but to recognize qualitative thinking as a sort of encompassing whole 
within which the logical dimension emerges and to which it looks back in order to gain 
its very sense.  Dewey distinguishes between,  
something called a "situation" and something termed an "object." By the 
term situation in this connection is signified the fact that the subject-
matter ultimately referred to in existential propositions is a complex 
existence that is held together in spite of its internal complexity by the 
fact that it is dominated and characterized throughout by a single 
quality. By "object" is meant some element in the complex whole that is 
defined in abstraction from the whole of which it is a distinction. The 
special point made is that the selective determination and relation of 
objects in thought is controlled by reference to a situation--to that which 
is constituted by a pervasive and internally integrating quality, so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lipman, A Life Teaching Thinking, 106. 
8 John Dewey, “Qualitative Thought,” in The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 5 (1929-1930), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 243. 
9 Ibid, 261. 
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failure to acknowledge the situation leaves, in the end, the logical force 
of objects and their relations inexplicable.10 
	  
Dewey notes that, while “in current logical formulations, the beginning is always 
made with ‘objects’,” actually “[no] such self-sufficient and self-enclosed entity can 
possibly lead anywhere nor be led to; connection among such entities is mechanical and 
arbitrary, not intellectual…In fact [subject and predicate] are determinations or 
distinctions instituted within the total subject-matter to which thought refers. When 
such propositions figure in logical textbooks, the actual subject-matter referred to is 
some branch of logical theory which is exemplified in the proposition.”11 
The real subject-matter is, therefore, the situation and the latter, as such, “is not 
and cannot be stated or made explicit. It is taken for granted, ‘understood,’ or implicit in 
all its propositional symbolization. It forms the universe of discourse of whatever is 
expressly stated or of what appears as a term in a proposition.”12 At the same time, 
though, “the situation controls the terms of thought, for they are its distinctions, and 
applicability to it is the ultimate test of their validity. It is this phase of the matter which 
is suggested by the earlier use of the idea of a pervasive and underlying quality.”13 
We can call “the pervasive and underlying quality” the sphere of the ‘sense,’ 
whereas what falls within the possibilities of the “propositional symbolization” can be 
termed the sphere of the “meaning.”14  Meaning is what is explicit, and can be stated 
and defined. Sense is what is included in every statement (insofar as it is meaning-ful) 
without being itself susceptible to be stated. In this perspective, by the idea of the 
meaning-fulness of a statement we refer not only to meaning(s) but to the fact that the 
statement emerges from a fullness of which it is an articulation (it is important to bear 
in mind that such fullness cannot be reduced to its articulations, even if all possible ones 
have been taken into consideration).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid, 246. 
11 Ibid, 246-47. 
12 Ibid, 247. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See, Bruno Coppola, L’Ineffabile Bellezza: Filosofia e Narrazione (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1996). 
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If not ‘statable’, the domain of the sense is not, however, ineffable nor does any 
Wittgensteinian verdict of the silence hang over it. In fact, it can be narrated – and 
should be, if we have to recognize its significance.15 Narrative, insofar as it hands over 
the underlying quality―what I called the ‘sense’―is not primarily an adventure of 
feeling but rather of thinking and it is ultimately a sort of inquiry. Indeed, a novel 
essentially presents a search for the sense in a problematic world on the part of heroes, 
who are “experimental egos.”16 
Even the meanings of philosophy do not come into being ready-made, like 
Minerva from the head of Zeus, but emerge from a background/fullness of sense of 
which they are articulations. As Dewey puts it at the beginning of Experience and Nature, 
philosophical problems are generated by “empirical needs” and “the refined products” 
of the philosophical inquiry have to be “return[ed]…back to the context of actual 
experience, there to receive their check, inherit their full content of meaning, and give 
illumination and guidance in the immediate perplexities which originally occasioned 
reflection.”17 
Reattaining such a background situation is ultimately an inquiry which can be 
reported principally through narrative. Beginning his first novel by ‘situating’ Harry 
Stottlemeier’s discovery within a peculiar context, Lipman carries out a non-anodyne 
move: he makes clear that that discovery, like any other in philosophy, “probably 
wouldn’t have happened” out of that situation, and along the whole curriculum the 
philosophical meanings investigated by the characters always emerge from and are 
constantly referred back to background situations.  
And, for the aforementioned reasons, all this cannot happen unless in a narrative. 
By doing so Lipman puts the inside of philosophy on the outside; what is manifest in 
(the history of) philosophy―the concepts―are considered on their background, on the 
backdrop of the problematic (i.e., in need of inquiry) situations from which they derive.  
In Dewey’s words:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 
16 Milan Kundera, L’Arte del Romanzo, trans. E. Marchi (Milano: Adelphi, 1988). 
17 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, in The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 1 (1925), ed. J. A. Boydston 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 36-7. 
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The problem is had or experienced before it can be stated or set forth; 
but it is had as an immediate quality of the whole situation. The sense of 
something problematic, of something perplexing and to be resolved, 
marks the presence of something pervading all elements and 
considerations. Thought is the operation by which it is converted into 
pertinent and coherent terms.18 
	  
And such a movement of re-situating philosophy is not by chance also a 
movement of philosophy to children. Indeed, by drawing upon Merleau-Ponty, but 
with a peculiar hermeneutical bending, we can say that it is because we have been 
children that we are able to have a ‘grip’ on that original doxa, on that qualitativeness 
from which those (philosophical) objects named concepts emerge (or, to refer again to 
Lipman, in children there is eminently what Dewey called qualitative thought).19 
Accordingly, there is a sort of pre-established harmony in the fact that once Lipman 
decided to mobilise philosophy as a way of educating children for thinking, he invented 
a new kind of philosophical text and, on the other hand, that the invention of the 
philosophical novel happened within the framework of a reflection on the ‘quality’ of 
children’s thinking. 
From this perspective I suggest reading also Lipman’s important distinction 
between concept and schema: the former is “an idea we have of a class of things that 
share one or more common features or […] an idea we have of a family of things in 
which some features are shared by some members but no feature needs be shared by all 
members”; the latter is “not a static aggregate or mechanical agglomeration. It is organic 
and dynamic.”20  De Marzio points out sagaciously the relevance of such a distinction 
within Lipman’s view of philosophical narratives as a model for children’s thinking:  
	  
The schemata of thinking...would serve as the manner of organization of 
the philosophical text...the texts are not organized by systems of 
concepts, which would reflect an inert arrangement of ‘digestible’ facts, 
but rather the texts are organized according to schemata, which can be 
thought of as the tools or skills with which we question and make sense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Dewey, “Qualitative Thought,” 249. 
19 See, especially, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, trans. William Cobb (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964); and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne 
Lectures, 1949-1952, trans. Talia Welsh (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010). 
20 Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 219-220. 
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of the world and our place in it—that is to say, with which we engage in 
philosophical thinking.21 
	  
But the role of concepts is not to be underrated. Indeed, “[by] means of the 
organizing principles embodied in the class and the family, we are able to construct 
concepts by means of which we cluster the information in a given cognitive domain and 
make it manageable. Without organizing principles, a domain is a mere aggregation of 
data.”22 I propose reading the difference between schema and concept into that between 
situation and object: situations are objectified in meanings (i.e., concepts) in order to 
manage them but, as concepts have sense only on the backdrop of situations, it is just in 
the movement of that schema par excellence which narrative is that concepts explored by 
the characters acquire their full ’meaning’.  
Lipman’s novels, insofar as they present a search for the sense of experience, 
represent/reconstruct inquiries into some concepts―of (the history of) 
philosophy―(passing) through their meanings towards the situations from which they 
(can) emerge and of which they are (possible) articulations. All this required―in the 
phase of the creation and writing of the novels―a ‘schematization’ of those concepts, 
which may be the most important of Lipman’s philosophical (not only educational) 
achievements (the ‘Sources and References’ for Lipman’s novels bear powerful witness 
to this ingenious work in its translation and re-territorialization of the conceptual 
heritage of philosophy).23  
 
Final remarks: Between dramatization and Bildung 
By ‘schematizing’ the concepts/meanings of the philosophical tradition, by re-
situating them within the context of human experience and the search for sense, by 
translating and re-territorializing them into a children’s world, Lipman puts the inside 
of philosophy on the outside. This is the movement which presides over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Darryl M. De Marzio, “What Happens in Philosophical Texts: Matthew Lipman’s Theory and Practice of the 
Philosophical Novel as Model,” Childhood & Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 13 (2011): 41. 
22 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 220. 
23 See, for instance, Ann M. Sharp & Ronald F. Reed, eds., Studies in Philosophy for Children: Harry 
Stottlemeier’s Discovery (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 189ff.   
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“dramatization” of philosophy by “casting it in the modality of fictional narrative.”24 
We should take ‘dramatization’ in a double sense: first, it means that (the history of) 
philosophy is delivered from a monologic closure and is valorized in its dialogic 
potential. Bakhtin showed that dialogicity and plurivocality are the main features of the 
novel: the latter does not exist as a genre without a plurality of voices. The risk with the 
conceptual heritage of (the history of) philosophy reconstructed in Lipman’s novel 
could have been that it was presented in such an authoritative way that any real 
dialogue was excluded from the outset.25 To make an inquiring dialogue between 
characters possible required that the meanings of (the history of) philosophy were 
themselves ‘dialogized,’ so to speak, and not dispensed as in a lecture. In this 
perspective, the movement through which he re-situates philosophy, that is, refers 
‘philosophical objects’―concepts/meanings―back to the situation(s) within which the 
former make sense prevents Lipman from lapsing into forms of philosophical narrative 
like Gaarder’s Sophie’s World where the history of philosophy is presented in a quite 
canonical way, like a classic course of philosophy (and actually one does not 
understand why Sophie finds the course so different from school, apart from some 
enticing and adventurous allurement). 
Secondly, we should hear in the word ‘dramatization’ the echo of the Greek verb 
drân, to do. Within Lipman’s novels and beyond them (in that community of inquiry 
which they contribute to modelling) philosophy is done, not learnt (once again differently 
from texts like Gaarder’s, that―paradoxically enough given the rich panoply of 
narrative strategies―are quite expository rather than narrative as far as philosophical 
‘contents’ are concerned).26 
To such a movement of dramatization, which Lipman realizes in creating novels, 
does another correspond within the texts:  
Each of the novels in the Philosophy for Children curriculum begins 
with a problem and works its way through to some kind of solution by 
the end of the book. The curriculum is therefore, in a sense, a narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Matthew Lipman, “Philosophical Discussion Plans and Exercises,” 64. 
25 Michail Bachtin, Estetica e Romanzo (Milano: Einaudi, 2001) 
26 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 214-15. 
stefano oliverio 
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 11, n. 21, jan-jun. 2015, pp. 81-92. issn 1984-5987	   91 
of the children’s acquisition of the moral qualities they are expected to model 
to one another.27  
	  
The movement from problem to solution is that of doing philosophy, according to 
the Deweyan model of inquiry. The interweaving of cognitive growth and moral 
development, which characters experience through their philosophical inquiry, makes 
Lipman’s novels a sort of philosophical Bildungsromane. The Bildung of Lipman’s 
characters is not, however, the progress toward absolute knowledge (ultimately a de-
situated knowledge in which concepts reign over situations) nor a kind of internal self-
cultivation; in the word we should rather hear the resonance of what Heidegger, 
referring to paideía, called Um- und Eingewöhnung, a constant re-adjustment and 
familiarization with changing situations by deploying schemata and concepts to make 
sense of them.28  
It is particularly relevant in Heidegger’s expression that he connects Bildung to 
the semantic field of wohnen (=to inhabit). Without rehearsing his complex view on 
wohnen, what I am interested in is how Lipman, in his autobiography from which I have 
taken my cue, refers to a change of the world to inhabit as the main goal of his 
educational enterprise. In Lipman’s words, what is at stake in his novels as the 
Bildungsromane and as the ‘didactic tool’ for the Bildung of children is the building of “a 
better and more reasonable world for our children and their children to inhabit: a world 
that looks as beautiful from across the street as it does from the distance of space.”29  
Turning philosophy inside-out consists ultimately in setting it free from its de-
worlded insulation, to which the Academic tradition has condemned it for a long time,30 
so that philosophy―in Dewey’s memorable words―“ceases to be a device for dealing 
with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lipman, A Life Teaching Thinking, 117. 
28 Martin Heidegger, “Platons Wehre der Wahreit,” in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1996), 217. 
29 Lipman, A Life Teaching Thinking, 170. 
30 See, Antonio Cosentino and Stefano Oliverio, Comunità di Ricerca Filosofica e Formazione: Pratiche di 
Coltivazione del Pensiero (Napoli: Liguori, 2011), 131ff.   
lipman’s novels or turning philosophy inside-out  
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 11, n. 21, jan-jun. 2015, pp. 81-92. issn 1984-5987	  92 
for dealing with the problems of men”31 and can, therefore, help to equip all of us, 
including children, with those habits of critical, creative and careful thinking which 
allow us to in-habit the world in an increasingly meaningful way. 
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